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HEALTH REFORM 
ISSUE BRIEF
May 12, 2017
Cost-Sharing Reductions in the Health Insurance 
Marketplace: Uncertainty and Implications for Georgia
ANDREW  YOUNG SCHOOL
O F  P O L I C Y  S T U D I E S
Cost-sharing reductions (CSRs) are subsidies that 
assist individuals enrolled in the Health Insurance 
Marketplace by lowering out-of-pocket expenses 
for care. Uncertainty over the future of CSR funding 
has significant implications for Marketplace 
enrollees and insurers. If the federal government 
halts CSR payments, premiums and insurer 
participation in the Health Insurance Marketplace 
could change, potentially increasing the cost of 
coverage and decreasing consumer choice.
Compared to employer-sponsored insurance, 
through which 85% of Georgians with private 
health insurance obtain coverage, health insurance 
purchased on the individual market is typically 
more expensive and less generous. Part of the 
discrepancy in price and generosity of benefits is 
driven by federal tax law, which allows group health 
insurance coverage to be purchased by employers 
with “pretax” dollars that are not treated as income 
to employees, whereas individual market plans are 
purchased with post-tax income.  
In order to expand private insurance to those 
not receiving coverage through an employer, 
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) created premium 
subsidies to make purchasing individual plans more 
affordable (delivered via Advance Premium Tax 
Credits) and subsidies that make coverage more 
generous and offset cost-sharing requirements of 
individual coverage (CSRs). Both types of subsidies 
are targeted exclusively at low- and moderate-
income individuals and are critical to allowing 
Marketplace purchasers to obtain affordable 
insurance.  
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Cost-Sharing Reductions
What is it? Subsidies to offset the cost 
of more generous coverage 
(plans with a higher actuarial 
value) in the Health Insurance
Marketplace by lowering out-
of-pocket expenses for care 
like deductibles, coinsurance, 
and copayments.
How are the subsidies 
determined?
The actuarial value of a silver 
plan is enhanced for eligible
enrollees on a sliding scale 
basis from 70% actuarial 
value up to 94%.  
Who is eligible? Individuals without access 
to employer-sponsored 
insurance and with a family 
income between 100% and 
250% of the federal poverty 
level who purchase a silver
plan on the Health Insurance 
Marketplace.
How are the payments 
operationalized?
Insurers pay claims based on 
the projected eligibility of the 
consumer for CSR payments.  
After the consumer’s tax 
return is filed, reconciliation 
between the insurer, federal 
government, and consumer 
occurs.
How much is paid? An estimated total of $7 
billion for fiscal year 2017 and 
$10 billion for 2018.1
1 https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/recurringdata
   /51298-2017-01-healthinsurance.pdf
2 When Tom Price was appointed HHS secretary earlier this year, the name of the case was changed to House v. Price.
3 https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2017/04/27/csr-payments
4 http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2016/dec/loss-of-cost-sharing-reductions
5 http://kff.org/health-reform/press-release/estimates-average-aca-marketplace-premiums-for-silver-plans-would-need-to-increase-by-19-to-compen
  sate-for-lack-of-funding-for-cost-sharing-subsidies/
6 http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/87816/2001126-uncertain-future-for-affordable-care-act-leads-insurers-to-rethink-participa
  tion-prices.pdf
CSR Regulation and Litigation
Section 1402 of the ACA (Pub.L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010)) provides for reductions in cost-
sharing for purchasers of silver plans (a plan with an 
actuarial value level of 70%) who are between 100% 
and 250% of the federal poverty level (FPL). These 
reductions have the effect of increasing the actuarial 
value of silver plans as follows:
• 100%-150% FPL: from 70% to 94%
• 151%-200% FPL: from 70% to 87%
• 201%-250% FPL: from 70% to 73%
• > 250%: no change
The higher the actuarial value of a health plan, the 
less costs a consumer bears once they start using 
their health insurance. Therefore, for those in the 
lower FPL range, the CSRs offer substantial savings 
through lower deductibles, copayments, and 
other out-of-pocket costs. However, they are only 
available to individuals or families within the above 
income ranges who purchase a silver plan. The ACA 
and accompanying regulations provide that insurers 
are to be reimbursed by the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) for the cost of these 
CSRs (45 C.F.R. § 156.420). 
In November 2014, the House of Representatives 
sued then-HHS Secretary Sylvia Burwell, arguing 
that HHS did not have the authority to reimburse 
insurers for the CSRs because Congress had not 
appropriated the money for it to do so (House 
of Representatives v. Burwell, et al., U.S. Dist. 
Ct. D.C. case No. 14-cv-01967, Nov. 21, 2014).2 
The district court ruled in the House’s favor and 
enjoined HHS from making any further payments 
until an appropriation was passed. The court’s 
injunction, however, was stayed pending an appeal 
by the administration. That appeal is ongoing. The 
House has asked for additional time to work out a 
settlement with the new administration.
The White House has determined that, for the time 
being, the administration will continue to reimburse 
insurers for the CSRs.3 However, it is not clear yet 
what the administration intends to do in the long 
term. The House and administration could reach a 
settlement that would continue the reimbursements 
to insurers, or the administration could drop the 
lawsuit altogether, allowing the lower court’s 
decision to stand, thus ending payments to 
insurers.  
By law, insurers are still required to offer CSR 
subsidies to enrollees at or below 250% FPL. 
In the event that the federal government halts 
reimbursements for CSRs, insurers may increase 
premiums to recoup lost CSR funding, take 
on the additional costs of the subsidies, exit 
the Health Insurance Marketplace, or leave 
the individual marketplace entirely.4 A recent 
analysis by the Kaiser Family Foundation 
indicates that for a silver plan sold on the Health 
Insurance Marketplace, premiums would need 
to increase by an average of 19% to compensate 
for insurers losing CSR funding (in Georgia these 
premiums would need to increase by 23%).5 
Without a guarantee of funding, several insurers 
across the country indicated they would have 
to reconsider their participation in the ACA’s 
Health Insurance Marketplace because they are 
not in a position to absorb those costs.6
Potential Impact on the Georgia 
Consumer 
Georgia is divided into 16 geographic insurance 
markets (see map above). Plan premiums, 
out-of-pocket expenses, patient populations, 
and consumer coverage choices vary among 
Source: The Atlanta Journal Constitution; 
Georgia Insurance Department
7 Market locations 1, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, and 16 have maximum out-of-pocket expenses for an individual of $7,150 for 2017.
Eligible for CSR Subsidy 
(150% FPL)
Not Eligible for CSR 
Subsidy (300% FPL)
Premium & Potential 
CSR Subsidies
Individual Parent + 2 Children Individual
Parent + 2 
Children Individual
Parent + 2 
Children
Annual income $17,820 $30,240 $35,640 $60,480
Monthly premium for 
benchmark plan after 
Advanced Premium Tax 
Credit 
$61 $103 $288 $489 $227 $386
Deductible $250 $500 $3,000 $6,000 $2,750 $5,500
Out-of-pocket maximum $500 $1000 $7,150 $14,300 $6,650 $13,300
Silver Plan Premium and CSR Subsidies
Source:  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Health Insurance Marketplace Public Use Files
Note: Eligibility for tax credits and subsidies for 2017 are based on household income for 2016.
markets. For example, in 2017, out-of-pocket 
maximums for an individual ranged from $4,850 in 
the Macon area (market 12) to $7,150 across nine 
Georgia markets.  
The following table illustrates the variation in 
costs for coverage and cost-sharing among those 
eligible for a CSR who purchase a silver plan. 
Here, anticipated premiums and cost-sharing in 
the average Georgia market are compared to 
show the family expense for individual coverage. 
For an individual or family, average deductibles 
and out-of-pocket maximums are significantly 
lower at 150% FPL due to CSR eligibility (savings 
highlighted in red). For example, a family of three 
at 150% FPL with a silver plan saves a potential 
$5,500 in deductible and $13,300 in out-of-pocket 
costs through CSR subsidies.
Enrollment and Competition 
The table on the following page describes 
enrollment and insurer competition across 
Georgia’s 16 Health Insurance Marketplace areas, 
which would be impacted by changes in CSR 
funding. Enrollment totals for 2016 are provided, 
along with the share of individuals qualifying for 
CSRs (income less than or equal to 250% FPL). 
Of the over one-half million Georgians enrolled 
on the Health Insurance Marketplace in 2016, 
approximately 65% received a CSR (see table).  
Consumer choice and competition among 
plans is a function of the number of insurers 
participating in the Health Insurance 
Marketplace. In 2017, six Georgia Marketplace 
locations have only one insurer; the highest 
concentration of insurer options is in Metro 
Atlanta. In 2016, all Georgia markets were 
served by at least two insurers. If fewer 
competitors offer plans in the Marketplace 
due to federal CSR reimbursement uncertainty, 
premiums and other health plan expenses could 
increase significantly. The possibility of an insurer 
exiting the Marketplace due to CSR uncertainty is 
of even greater concern in the six Georgia markets 
(serving an estimated 73,000 Georgians) that have 
only one insurer in 2017. Regardless of market 
competition, CSR reimbursement uncertainty 
alone may be enough to prevent insurers from 
accurately estimating risk and increasing insurance 
premiums and costs.
At this time, the future of funding for CSRs 
is uncertain. The Georgia Health Insurance 
Marketplace serves over 580,000 consumers, 
including over 380,000 individuals who are 
eligible for CSRs that insurers are required 
to provide. Eliminating CSR payments may 
change the landscape of the individual health 
insurance market by increasing plan premiums 
if insurers have to compensate for lost CSR 
funding or reducing consumer choice if insurers 
choose to leave the marketplace.  
2016 Enrollment Competition
General Market 
Location
Georgia 
Market 
Number
Total 
Enrollment 
2016 
% Receiving 
CSR
% With 
Advanced 
Tax Credit
Total 
Insurers 
2016
Total 
Insurers 
2017
Albany and Rural South 1 10,409 67% 90% 2 1
Athens and Rural North 2 16,174 64% 85% 6 3
Metro Atlanta 3 357,089 64% 85% 7 5
West GA / Carrolton 4 20,855 67% 88% 4 2  
Augusta 5 23,126 69% 87% 2 1
Brunswick 6 12,700 66% 90% 2 1
Chattanooga 7 5,998 64% 89% 3 2
Columbus 8 16,340 70% 89% 4 3
Rural North 9 6,412 71% 92% 3 2
Gainesville and Rural NE 10 24,666 66% 90% 4 2
Rural South Central 11 7,544 72% 83% 3 1
Macon 12 19,821 69% 89% 3 2
Rural North West 13 12,515 67% 90% 5 2
Savannah 14 34,665 65% 83% 3 3
Valdosta and Rural South 15 16,425 68% 92% 2 1
Rural — South Central 16 3,094 71% 90% 2 1
Statewide Totals 587,833 65% 86% 7 5
Source:  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Health Insurance Marketplace Public Use Files
Definitions
Actuarial value (AV) 
Distinguishes plans by the average amount of 
medical costs a plan will pay for. The higher the 
AV, the lower the out-of-pocket costs for plan 
members (and the higher the plan premiums). 
For example, an AV of 90% means the plan, on 
average, will cover 90% of an insured individual’s 
medical expenses, and for most of the covered 
benefits, the insured will be responsible for paying 
10% of the cost.
Advance Premium Tax Credit (APTC)
Subsidy available to individuals between 100% 
and 400% FPL purchasing plans on the Health 
Insurance Marketplace. APTCs are paid out in 
advance to the health plans on behalf of the 
taxpayer to lower monthly premiums. APTC 
amounts are based on estimated annual income 
and family size.  
Federal poverty level (FPL)
Measure of income used to determine eligibility 
for various types of assistance and public 
programs. The FPL guidelines are updated 
annually and are based on both household size 
and income. For 2017, an individual earning 
$12,060 and a family of four earning $24,600 are 
both considered to be at 100% of the FPL. 
Silver plan
The Health Insurance Marketplace attaches one 
of four “metal” levels to plans, based on their 
AV. “Platinum” plans have an AV of 90%, “gold” 
plans have an AV of 80%, “silver” plans have an 
AV of 70%, and “bronze” plans have an AV of 60%. 
Thus, compared to the other “metal” levels, silver 
plans fall somewhere in the middle, with moderate 
monthly premiums and out-of-pocket costs.  CSRs 
only apply to silver plans.
8 https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines 
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